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PROHIBITING RACIAL PROFILING: THE ACLU’S 
ORCHESTRATION OF THE MISSOURI LEGISLATION 
LELAND WARE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial profiling is prevalent in America.  Despite the civil rights victories 
of thirty years ago, official racial prejudice is still reflected throughout the 
criminal justice system.  For people of color in cities large and small across 
this nation, north and south, east and west, Jim Crow “justice” is alive and 
well.1 
Racial profiling occurs when the police target an individual for 
investigation on the basis of race or ethnicity rather than individualized or 
particuralized factors that would constitute a legitimate basis for believing that 
the person has engaged in unlawful activities or is about to do so.  While some 
studies attribute the proliferation of racial profiling to the war on drugs in the 
1980s,2 the practice is long-standing and well-known among those who have 
been its victims.  The roots of racial profiling can be traced to the post-
Reconstruction, Jim Crow era of the late 19th century when vagrancy, loitering, 
and other laws were used as an excuse to harass and intimidate African-
Americans in the South.3  This pernicious conduct has been a fact of everyday 
life for generations of African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and other people of 
color.  What is different now is the long overdue attention that it has received 
from the public at large.4 
 
* Leland Ware, Louis L. Redding Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Delaware.  
This article is based on a presentation made by the author on April 5, 2002, in the course of the 
Sanford E. Sarasohn Memorial Lectureship on Law Enforcement: New Approaches to Police 
Accountability at the Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. See DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR 
NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999), http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html. 
 2. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK (2002). 
 3. See generally, LEON F. LITWAK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE 
OF JIM CROW (1998). 
 4. In a poll released in 1999, more than half of the individuals responding stated that police 
engaged in racial profiling.  Eighty-one percent of them stated that they disapproved of the 
practice.  Of the adults that were polled, fifty-nine percent said that racial profiling was 
widespread.  Fifty-six percent of whites and seventy-seven percent of the blacks stated that they 
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Racial profiling has received a considerable amount of media attention.  It 
has been the focus of a nationwide effort organized by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU).  Law-enforcement officials in several jurisdictions 
have yielded to demands to collect data that will allow researchers to 
determine whether police are targeting a disproportionate percentage of 
minority motorists for traffic stops.5  A recently enacted Missouri law prohibits 
profiling outright.6 
This article examines the campaign of the American Civil Liberties 
Union’s eastern Missouri affiliate to outlaw racial profiling in Missouri, an 
effort that led to prohibition of the practice in that state.  Additionally, the 
article explores some of the legal and public policy implications of this 
practice that provided the backdrop for the ACLU’s campaign. 
THE DECISION TO CHALLENGE RACIAL PROFILING IN MISSOURI 
The campaign to eliminate racial profiling in Missouri began in June of 
1999, when the ACLU’s National Office released a comprehensive study of 
racial profiling.  The report, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on the 
Nation’s Highways, was authored by David Harris, a law professor at the 
University of Toledo.7  It was distributed to all of the ACLU’s local affiliates.  
The report analyzed the legal issues presented by the practice and included 
extensive empirical data.  At the time this report was issued, racial profiling 
had received a considerable amount of attention in the media.  Two widely-
publicized studies conducted by Dr. John Lamberth, of Temple University, 
contained data and findings that confirmed what many observers had long 
suspected; African-Americans and other people of color were being 
systematically targeted by law enforcement officials based solely on their race 
and ethnicity.  In a study done in New Jersey in which drivers along a stretch 
of Interstate 95 were observed, Dr. Lamberth found that blacks and whites 
violated the traffic laws at essentially the same rate.  However, 73.2% of the 
motorists stopped and arrested were black, while only 13.5% of the vehicles 
had a black driver or passenger.8  Data from a study in Maryland provided 
similar findings to those from the New Jersey study.  Drivers along a stretch of 
Interstate 95 in Maryland were observed over a period of several months.  Dr. 
 
believed that racial profiling was pervasive.  Racially Profiling Seen as Widespread, Particularly 
Among Young Black Men, Gallup Poll Organization, Dec. 9, 1999, reprinted in GEORGE GALLUP 
JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1999, at 238 (1999). 
 5. See David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 79-80 
(2003). 
 6. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650 (Supp. 2001). 
 7. HARRIS, supra note 1. 
 8. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While 
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 277-80 (1999). 
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Lamberth found that only 17.5% of the traffic code violators were black, but 
72% of the individuals stopped and searched were black.9  Lamberth 
concluded that the likelihood that this could have occurred by chance was 
“substantially less than one in one billion.”10  Studies conducted in other 
localities contained similar findings.11 
When the ACLU’s 1999 report was released, I was vice president of the 
ACLU’s eastern Missouri affiliate (“ACLU/EM”), and a member of the 
National Board of Directors.  The report provoked some deep-seated feelings 
within me.  Like most African-Americans, I had personal experiences with 
profiling.  I decided that ACLU/EM should look for ways to implement the 
racial profiling campaign at the local level.  After discussions with other 
members of ACLU/EM’s Board of Directors, it was suggested that the matter 
be presented for discussion at an annual retreat of ACLU/EM’s Board where 
the organization decided its priorities for the upcoming year. 
The Board retreat was convened at the University of Missouri-St. Louis in 
September 1999.  I proffered a motion that ACLU/EM make racial profiling a 
top priority in the upcoming year.  After some discussion, long-time Board 
member Fred Epstein moved to amend my motion to state that the ACLU/EM 
should eliminate racial profiling in Missouri in the upcoming year.  I can recall 
thinking that it would be impossible to realize that goal, however 
commendable it was; but I kept that thought to myself, and consented to the 
modification.  The Board approved the resolution as amended. 
During the next few weeks, meetings of ACLU/EM’s Race and Equality 
Committee were convened to discuss the implementation of the resolution.  
The ACLU/EM staff set up a “hotline,” a special telephone number to receive 
racial profiling complaints similar to one that had been established by the 
National Office.  Despite the constraints imposed by a three person staff in the 
midst of transition resulting from the search for a new Executive Director, our 
Legal Director, Denise Leiberman, provided critical support, attending all of 
the meetings and coordinating our efforts.  Contacts were made with local 
community groups, including the NAACP, to request the referral of profiling 
complaints and to identify the localities where the problem seemed to be most 
severe. 
Within the area in which ACLU/EM operates, St. Louis County is one of 
the most populous regions, existing immediately adjacent to the City of St. 
Louis, and containing scores of small municipalities, many of which maintain 
their own police departments.  Because the staff received multiple complaints 
 
 9. Id. at 280-81. 
 10. Id. at 279.  See also, Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 425, 432 (discussing empirical evidence of profiling). 
 11. See Harris, supra note 8, at 281-88. 
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about certain of those jurisdictions, the Committee began to consider litigation 
against one or more of the localities identified in the complaints.  We also 
pursued other tactics.  A number of police departments in other states 
volunteered to collect data regarding traffic stops.  Steve Ryals, a civil rights 
attorney and member of the ACLU/EM’s legal steering committee, suggested 
that we meet with local police officials to suggest voluntary data collection.  
Denise Lieberman, Steve Ryals, and I met several times with the president of a 
local police chiefs’ organization to discuss data collection.  Law enforcement 
officials had an interesting response to our suggestions.  They claimed, on the 
one hand, that their officers did not engage in racial profiling, and on the other 
hand, that profiling was justified since racial minorities were more likely than 
whites to engage in criminal activities, positions both inconsistent and 
illogical.12  Our efforts to persuade St. Louis County municipalities to agree to 
data collection were unavailing.  We had more success with the City of St. 
Louis.  In the fall of 1999, Steve Ryals contacted Edward Roth, a member of 
the St. Louis Police Commission (a civilian oversight board), and persuaded 
him to meet with representatives of ACLU/EM to discuss racial profiling. 
Additionally, we made efforts to heighten public awareness of the abuses 
of racial profiling.  On October 7, 1999, a commentary, Racial Profiling 
Cannot be Tolerated, appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.13  Our efforts in 
this area mirrored the national organization’s efforts.  As a result of ACLU’s 
national campaigns, articles about racial profiling appeared in newspapers and 
periodicals in localities across the country.  The ACLU’s National Office 
developed advertisements that were published in the New York Times, the New 
Yorker magazine, and other highly respected publications. 
THE LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN 
In late 1999, Matt LeMieux, who had been recently hired as the Executive 
Director of ACLU/EM, suggested that we consider introducing an anti-racial 
profiling bill in the state legislature.  My reaction to this recommendation was 
similar to the skepticism I felt when Fred Epstein suggested that we could 
eliminate racial profiling in Missouri in one year.  I can recall thinking how 
improbable it would be to get an anti-racial profiling law enacted in a 
 
 12. Former ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser explained:  “Most players in the NBA are 
black.  But if you were trying to get a team together, you wouldn’t go out in the street and round 
up random African-Americans.  Most jazz musicians are black.  But if you went to hire a band, 
you wouldn’t go out in the street and round up random blacks and ask them if they played the 
saxophone.  It wouldn’t be a good way to find what you wanted.  It’s a very simple, logical 
fallacy.  The fact that most drug dealers are X does not mean that most X are drug dealers.”  Ira 
Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 712-13 (2000). 
 13. Leland Ware, Racial Profiling Cannot Be Tolerated, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 
1999, at B7. 
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jurisdiction as conservative as Missouri, but, again, kept that thought to myself.  
I decided that a legislative campaign would at least heighten public awareness 
of the problem.  We ultimately decided to pursue the legislative approach.  
ACLU/EM’s lobbyist identified a sponsor for the legislation, Representative 
Russell Gunn, an African-American legislator from St. Louis. 
As part of our public education activities, Brad Pierce, an ACLU/EM 
Board member and former affiliate president, organized a continuing legal 
education program sponsored by the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. 
Louis.  During the planning of this event, we contacted the ACLU’s National 
Office.  Steve Shapiro, the National Legal Director, agreed to sponsor staff 
attorney Reginald Shuford’s trip to St. Louis to participate in the continuing 
legal education program.  The National Office had designated Shuford as the 
ACLU’s lead attorney for racial profiling cases.  He was handling several 
highly publicized profiling cases at that time.  In February 2000, the program 
was convened at the offices of the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis.  I 
was pleasantly surprised to see Edward Roth, one of the Police Commissioners 
for the City of St. Louis, in the audience, as well as Missouri Supreme Court 
Judge Ronnie White, the first African-American to serve in that capacity. 
At the conclusion of the Bar Association program, Shuford and I rushed 
off to the University of Missouri’s campus where we were guests on a weekly 
call-in radio program hosted by St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter, Gregory 
Freeman.  The program was broadcast on WKMU, the local National Public 
Radio affiliate.  During the course of the broadcast, we received several 
telephone calls, some of which were hostile and openly racist.  A surprising 
number of them, however, were supportive.  Several of the callers discussed 
their personal experiences as the victims of racial profiling.  Other callers, who 
identified their race as white, described episodes of racial profiling that they 
had observed.  That evening, a reception was held at ACLU/EM’s offices 
where it was announced that Representative Gunn would introduce a profiling 
bill in the Missouri legislature.  Guests from local community organizations, 
including the Urban League and the NAACP, attended that event, and agreed 
to support the legislative effort.  During his visit, Shuford also made a formal 
presentation on racial profiling at a program that was convened at St. Louis 
University School of Law. 
On February 15, 2000, the St. Louis Police Commission, at the prompting 
of Commissioner Edward Roth, adopted a policy banning racial profiling.  This 
was reported in front-page headlines in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.14  
Representative Gunn introduced an anti-racial profiling bill in the House in 
February 2000.  On February 23, 2000, a press conference was held in St. 
 
 14. Bill Bryan, St. Louis Police Board Votes Unanimously To Outlaw Racial Profiling by 
Officers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 2000, at A1. 
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Louis to announce the introduction of the legislation.  The press conference 
was attended by representatives of community groups supporting the bill, 
including the ACLU/EM, the Urban League, the NAACP, the Mound City Bar 
Association (a black lawyer’s organization), the St. Louis Clergy Coalition, the 
Organization of Black Struggle, and the Midwest Council of the Union of 
American Hebrew Congregations.  Shortly thereafter, without consulting us 
Senator Wayne Goode introduced a similar measure in the Missouri Senate.15 
In March, hearings were held at the state capital in Jefferson City, 
Missouri.  Several members of the legislature’s black caucus spoke 
passionately about their personal experiences as victims of profiling.  The 
Senate approved the bill on March 28, 2000.16  In April 2000, on the last day of 
the legislative session, Senator Goode’s bill was enacted into law by the 
legislature.  Under the law, every police agency in Missouri is required to 
record information after every traffic stop, including the race and age of the 
driver, the violation leading to the stop, whether a search was conducted, the 
legal basis for any search, the result and duration of the search and whether any 
citation was issued.  The law also required Missouri law enforcement agencies 
to adopt policies prohibiting officers from using violations of vehicle laws as a 
pretext to detain minority motorists.  The law requires this data to be used to 
identify officers in need of re-training.  It also authorizes the governor to 
withhold state funding from any agency that fails to comply with the law.17 
On June 5, 2000, representatives of ACLU/EM took part with others in a 
public signing ceremony that was convened by Missouri’s governor, the late 
Mel Carnahan, at the University of Missouri-St. Louis.18  In a press release, the 
ACLU’s National Office stated the Missouri legislation is “the strongest and 
 
 15. Tim O’Neil, State Legislator’s Bill Bans Racial Profiling, Calls For Reporting Race Of 
Pulled-Over Drivers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH Feb. 24, 2000, at A 10. 
 16. Eric Stern, State Senate Approves Bill to Prohibit Racial Profiling: Police Would Have 
to Keep Data on Drivers They Stop, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2000, at B1. 
 17. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650.6 (2000 & Supp. 2001). 
 18. Eric Stern, Carnahan Signs Law Barring Racial Profiling by Police; Officers Will Be 
Required to Keep Log of Traffic Stops; Ban Takes Effect Aug. 28, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 6, 2000, at B1.  ACLU/EM’s legislative campaign may have been aided by local political 
dynamics. Representative Russell Gunn, an African American state legislator from St. Louis, 
sponsored the bill supported by ACLU/EM. Shortly after Gunn’s bill was introduced in the House 
of Representatives, Wayne Goode, a white state Senator, introduced a separate, but very similar, 
bill in the Senate. Gunn’s House district and Goode’s Senate district are located in overlapping 
areas in north St. Louis County. Goode had served in the state legislature for several years. His 
district, which was originally largely white, had a large and growing black population. Gunn 
planned to run for Goode’s Senate seat. It has been suggested by some observers that Goode used 
the racial profiling bill to appeal to his black constituency and to forestall Gunn’s challenge. 
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most comprehensive state law combating racial profiling by law enforcement 
officers.”19 
JUDICIAL REACTION TO PROFILING CLAIMS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 
“right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .”20  A police officer is allowed 
to temporarily detain an individual if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” 
that a person has committed a crime or is about to do so.21  Reasonable 
suspicion consists of  “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
person stopped of criminal activity.”22  Furthermore, the officer must be able to 
“articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of 
criminal activity.”23  As the Supreme Court explained, “While reasonable 
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a 
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for 
making the stop.”24 
The Fourth Amendment rights of automobile drivers and passengers have 
been undermined by a series of Supreme Court decisions that gave police 
officers broad authority to detain, question and search vehicle occupants even 
when there is no firm basis for believing that a crime has been committed.  As 
longtime civil rights lawyer David Rudovsky observed, after a car has been 
stopped for a minor traffic offense,25 the driver and passengers can be ordered 
to stand outside of the vehicle without any evidence that they pose a danger to 
the officer.26  At any time during the traffic stop, police officers (who are 
usually armed) can request authorization to search the occupants or the vehicle 
without advising the affected individuals that their consent is not obligatory, or 
that they are free to leave at any time.27  Any drugs or other contraband in 
“plain view” can be seized and used as the basis for a determination of cause to 
 
 19. ACLU Praises New Missouri DWB Law as Strongest in Nation, NEWSWIRE (ACLU) 
June 6, 2000, at http://archive.aclu.org/news/2000/w060600a.html. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 22. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
 23. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 24. Id. at 123 (internal citations omitted). 
 25. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 26. David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and 
Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 317 (2001) (citing Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)). 
 27. Id. at 317-18 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)). 
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arrest the vehicle’s occupants.28  Any person who appears to the officer to 
present a danger can be frisked.29  If there is an arrest, a full-scale search of the 
interior of the vehicle and all containers, whether belonging to the driver or the 
occupants is permissible.30  Police officers are also authorized to question the 
occupants of the car during a traffic stop without providing Miranda 
warnings.31 
The Fourth Amendment rights of automobile occupants were weakened 
further by a 1996 Supreme Court decision, Whren v. United States,32 which 
endorsed the practice of “pretext stops.”  In Whren, plainclothes officers 
patrolling a well-known drug trafficking area in Washington D.C. observed a 
vehicle waiting at a stop sign for “an unusually long time.”33  The vehicle 
turned suddenly and sped off at what the officers described as an 
“unreasonable” speed.  The officers stopped the vehicle allegedly to cite the 
driver for a traffic violation but in the course of doing so, observed plastic bags 
of crack cocaine in the possession of one of the occupants.  After their arrest, 
the defendants moved to suppress the admission of the drugs as evidence, 
arguing that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe that 
they were engaged in illegal drug activities, and that the officers’ justification 
for stopping them was a pretext for a drug investigation.34  The court upheld 
the validity of the search, stating that when police have probable cause to 
believe that a traffic violation has occurred, an officer’s actual motivation for 
initiating the stop is irrelevant.35  This decision opens the door to abuses such 
as racial profiling.  It allows officers to stop motorists suspected of being 
involved in any type of unlawful conduct, even when they lack an adequate 
cause to legally justify the suspicion and detention, as long as they can find a 
traffic-related excuse to detain them. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Whren reflects what Professor Alan 
Freeman described as the “perpetrator’s perspective.”36  This is the dominant 
 
 28. Id. at 318 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1990); United States v. 
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)). 
 29. Id. (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983)). 
 30. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302-07 (1999); California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)). 
 31. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-41 (1984); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 32. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996). 
 33. Id. at 808. 
 34. Id. at 808-09. 
 35. Id. at 813. 
 36. See Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 
1407, 1412 (1990), reprinted in THE POLITICS OF LAW, A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121 (David 
Kairys ed. 1990). 
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voice in judicial analysis of civil rights issues.37  Analysis that proceeds from 
this premise views discriminatory activities from the perspective of the 
dominant majority, but fails to account for the consequences of the conduct on 
the victim.  The victim perspective, however, considers the conditions resulting 
from discriminatory practices.  This perspective was not reflected in Whren. 
Consider one of my own experiences with racial profiling.  Some years ago 
I worked for a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia.  Occasionally, I would vacation at 
resorts on the Georgia Coast, not far from Savannah.  At the time, travel by 
automobile from Atlanta required one to travel south and then east for several 
miles through a series of small towns in southeast Georgia. 
On the return from one such trip, I was traveling west on a Georgia state 
highway.  As I reached the crest of an incline in the road I noticed, some 
distance ahead, a police officer on the side of the road questioning a motorist 
he had pulled over.  It was a clear day and I could see that the officer did not 
notice my approach because his back was turned in my direction.  Although I 
had not been speeding, I checked my speedometer to be certain that I was 
traveling within the speed limit.  Eventually, I passed the officer who was still 
questioning the African-American driver he had stopped. 
My sports car and dark complexion apparently attracted the officer’s 
attention.  After proceeding some distance down the road, I saw flashing lights 
in my rear-view mirror.  When I pulled over, the officer approached my 
vehicle.  The African-American motorist I had previously observed being 
questioned by the officer was in the back seat of the officer’s vehicle, 
apparently under arrest.  I asked, as politely as I could, whether there was a 
problem.  The officer responded in a deep Southern drawl that he had to “drive 
80 miles an hour” to catch up with me, implying that I had been speeding.  I 
handed him my driver’s license, my bar card (indicating that I was licensed to 
practice law in Georgia), and my business card, which bore the name of a well-
known civil rights law firm.  I told the officer that as it had been sometime 
since I had passed him, he would necessarily have had to exceed the speed 
limit to catch up with me.  I also said that I had seen him long before he had 
noticed me, so that even if I had been speeding, I would have slowed down.  
The officer looked at me somewhat warily.  I pointed to my visibly pregnant 
wife, and said I wouldn’t speed with her in the car.  The officer apparently 
decided that his pretext (that I was speeding) would not stand up in court, and 
that citing or arresting me would create legal problems for him (which was the 
unspoken message I intended to convey with my bar and business cards).  The 
officer reluctantly allowed me to proceed.  Had I not been a lawyer I probably 
would have been compelled to join my less fortunate brother in the back seat 
 
 37. Id. 
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of the officer’s car.  It is easy to understand Whren’s potential for encouraging 
police misconduct when one has been the victim of such behavior. 
ROUNDING UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
Although Whren suggested in dicta that singling out individuals solely on 
the basis of their race would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,38 the courts 
have not been receptive to claims asserted by profiling victims.  In Brown v. 
City of Oneonta,39 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that police 
officers could legitimately rely on race in a criminal investigation that involved 
questioning every young, African-American male in a town in upstate New 
York.  The facts in Brown indicate that in 1992, someone broke into a house 
near Oneonta and attacked a seventy-two-year-old woman.  The woman told 
police that she could not identify her assailant, but that he was a “black man, 
based on her view of the forearm, and that he was young, because of the speed 
with which he crossed her room.  She also told police that, as they struggled, 
the suspect had cut himself on the hand with a knife.”40  The police officers 
first secured a list of the black, male students at the nearby State University of 
New York College at Oneonta and questioned every one of them.  After failing 
to identify a suspect at the college, the police stopped and questioned every 
young, black male in Oneonta.41 
A class action was filed on behalf of black males alleging, among other 
things, racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The court held that the consideration of race in 
determining whom to question was legitimate based on the physical 
description given by the victim of the attack.42  The court also found that 
targeting young, black males was not a classification based on race, since age 
and gender were also factors.43  The court conceded that the Police 
Department’s approach, questioning every young, black in the town, might 
well have had a disparate impact on African-Americans.  The court suggested 
that such an adverse impact was permissible, speculating that if the community 
were primarily black, with very few white residents, and the search were for a 
young white male, the disparate impact would have been the same (although it 
acknowledged that such an investigation was highly unlikely).44 
 
 38. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law 
based on considerations such as race.”). 
 39. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 40. Id. at 334. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 337. 
 43. Id. at 337. 
 44. Id. at 338. 
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In another case, Chavez v. Illinois State Police,45 the plaintiffs challenged 
the validity of a drug interdiction program, “Operation Valkyrie,” which was 
employed by the Illinois State Police.  The plaintiffs claimed that the State 
Police engaged in racial profiling by using racial classifications in deciding 
whom to stop, detain, and search.  The plaintiffs relied on the testimony of 
blacks and Latinos who had been stopped by the Illinois State Police as well as 
statistical evidence that indicated that Hispanics were being stopped at 
disproportionate rates compared to similarly situated white motorists.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs had failed 
to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.46  The court found 
that the statistical evidence on which the plaintiffs relied was methodologically 
flawed for several reasons including, among other things, plaintiffs’ use of 
census data of all Illinois residents to determine the racial composition of a 
subset of residents—drivers on Illinois roads.  The court also found that the 
statistical samples were too small, and that there were other flaws in the ways 
the studies were developed and executed.  The court concluded that “expert 
analysis must be both relevant and reliable, and the statistics here are 
neither.”47 
The decisions in Chavez and Brown reflect the skepticism that profiling 
claims are receiving in the courts.  Contrary to the court’s conclusion in 
Brown, that there was no racial classification involved, the police employed an 
explicit racial classification—young, black males.  The police relied upon a 
vague description that fit hundreds of thousands of individuals.  This level of 
generality is not an adequate basis for believing that every young, black male 
in the area may have perpetrated the crime.  Too many innocent individuals 
were targeted. 
At least one Circuit has recognized the constitutional problems with this 
over-inclusive approach to criminal investigations.  In United States v. 
Montero-Camargo,48 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
border patrol agents could not rely on ethnicity as a factor in deciding to detain 
motorists in southern California.  In Montero-Carmargo, the defendants were 
driving separate automobiles near the Mexican border.  They both made U-
turns at a place where the view of border patrol agents stationed at a 
checkpoint was obstructed.  Both cars later stopped in an area that was used as 
a drop-off point for undocumented aliens and contraband.  The automobiles 
had Mexican license plates.  Both men appeared to be Hispanic.  Based on 
these and other considerations, the patrol agents decided to intercept the 
 
 45. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 46. Id. at 656. 
 47. Id. at 641. 
 48. United States v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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automobiles and found a quantity of marijuana after a search.  In an en banc 
opinion, the Court of Appeals condemned the agents’ reliance on ethnicity as a 
factor for determining probable cause because it failed to satisfy the 
“particularity” requirement of the Fourth Amendment.49 
The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion only exists when “an 
officer is aware of specific . . . facts which, when considered with objective 
and reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.”50  
Moreover, there must be a “reasonable suspicion that the particular person 
being stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime.”51  When a 
substantial number of people share a specific characteristic such as race or 
ethnicity, that characteristic is of little or no probative value.  While it is 
permissible to consider race when the suspected perpetrator of a specific 
offense has been identified as having that appearance, “persons of a particular 
racial or ethnic group may not be stopped and questioned because of such 
appearance, unless there are other individualized or particularized factors 
which, together with the racial or ethnic appearance identified, rise to the level 
of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”52  The requisite level of specificity 
was missing in Brown v. City of Oneonta.53 
One of the Court’s reasons for rejecting the ethnicity criterion in Montero- 
Carmargo was the high percentage of Hispanic persons residing in southern 
California.54  This made Hispanic ethnicity too common to be given any 
weight in deciding “reasonable suspicion.”  There were only a small number of 
African-Americans in the locality involved in Brown v. City of Oneonta, but 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning still applies to the actions of the Oneonta police.  
They proceeded solely on the basis of race and age, using criteria that applied 
to every young, black male in America.  There were no “individualized or 
particularized” characteristics in the description on which they had relied.  The 
officers did not look for a knife wound until after the young men were 
detained.  They simply rounded up the usual suspects: every young, black male 
they could find.  This approach to law enforcement fails the specificity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  It also “send[s] a clear message that 
those who are not white enjoy a lesser degree of constitutional protection - that 
they are in effect assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals 
 
 49. Id. at 1135. See also Young Ho Choi v. Gaston, 220 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). 
(reversing summary judgment where evidence was sufficient to create a jury question as to 
whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect or probable cause to arrest him, or 
acted instead on the basis of racial profiling). 
 50. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d at 1129. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1134, n.22. 
 53. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44. 
 54. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d at 1131. 
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second.”55  This attitude has infected the thinking in law enforcement circles 
for decades.  Racial profiling is merely one manifestation of this mindset.  It is 
a practice that cannot be condoned under any circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Racial profiling is well known among African-Americans and other people 
of color who, for generations, have been the victims of this pernicious form of 
police misconduct.  This conduct has been an unfortunate fact of everyday life 
for African-Americans.  Latinos in the southwest and border areas have also 
been targets for this form of abuse, as have Asian Americans.  The attention 
that racial profiling is now receiving is welcome, but long overdue. 
To address the issue directly, in 1999 the ACLU/EM chose a legislative 
path to reform that led to a rule of general applicability that is binding on all 
law enforcement agencies in the state of Missouri.  The law expressly prohibits 
racial profiling and requires all of the state’s law-enforcement agencies to 
collect data concerning traffic stops.  If ACLU/EM had pursued the litigation 
route, as originally anticipated, we would have devoted several months and 
considerable financial and other resources to pursuing civil actions against one 
or two small localities in St. Louis County.  The Chavez case in nearby Illinois 
highlighted the expense and difficulty in gathering data on traffic stops.  
Furthermore, there was no guarantee that we would have prevailed, given the 
difficulties racial profiling cases have encountered in the courts. 
The successful effort to outlaw racial profiling in Missouri shows how a 
small organization with limited resources can achieve a forceful result.  
ACLU/EM formed coalitions with other community groups that supported a 
statutory prohibition of the practice.  The organization’s lobbying and public 
education efforts benefited from the public attention generated by the National 
Office.  The National Office’s goals were advanced by the affiliate’s activities 
at the local level.  Together, our efforts produced a result in Missouri that 
would have been far more difficult to achieve had the affiliate or the National 
Office worked on this matter alone.  Today, racial profiling by law 
enforcement officials is banned in Missouri. 
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